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The standard approaches to rational individual choice address the question whether ob-
served choices by economic agents can be rationalized by a single preference relation on a
universal set of alternatives in the sense that these choices are given by the best elements
among the feasible ones according to this rationalizing relation. Richter (1966) provides
a necessary and sucient condition for rationalizability by an ordering (a reﬂexive, tran-
sitive, and complete binary relation) by means of his congruence axiom. This equivalence
result is obtained in a very general setting|no assumptions regarding the structure of
the universal set of alternatives or the domain of the choice correspondence|the class
of subsets of this set that may emerge in a choice situation|are imposed. Rationalizing
relations that are not necessarily orderings are analyzed in Richter (1971), and more spe-
cic choice environments are considered, for example, in Arrow (1959), Hansson (1968),
Houthakker (1950), Samuelson (1938, 1948), and Sen (1971).
Many of the results obtained regarding the rationalizability of individual choices can
be applied to social choice problems as well. In that case, the issue addressed in the
literature is the rationalizability of social choices by means of a single social ordering.
The problem analyzed in this paper deviates from that standard framework in that we
seek to investigate whether observed collective choices can be rationalized by a prole of
individual preference relations rather than a single social ranking. This question is raised
in Sprumont (2000) where conditions for the existence of preference proles that generate
observed choices as Nash equilibria or as the set of Pareto ecientoutcomes are discussed.
Brown and Matzkin (1996) derive restrictions on observed data to be generated in a
general-equilibrium setting, and a revealed-preference approach to noncooperative games
can be found in Zhou and Ray (1997). This paper phrases the above question in the
context of an exchange economy|more specically, we present necessary and sucient
conditions for selection correspondences to be rationalized in the sense that the observed
selections are the core elements generated by individual preferences with some standard
properties.
The selection correspondences analyzed here dier from the choice correspondences
employed in the standard rational choice model. Consider a class of exchange economies
where total endowments are xed. A selection correspondence assigns a set of recom-
mended allocations to each possible initial allocation of the total endowments. Thus,
unlike in the case of a standard choice problem, the set of feasible options is the same for
all choice situations|the selection correspondence depends on the reference point given
1by the initial endowment rather than the set of feasible allocations. As a consequence,
the axioms we employ are of a dierent nature than those that can be found in the earlier
rational choice literature.
A general analysis of this kind of collective rationalizability is a complex problem.
Sprumont (1999) examines properties of the Pareto relation in the two-agent case, and
the general case involving an arbitrary number of agents remains an open question. Re-
lated literature on the mathematical problem of determining the dimension of partially
ordered sets conrms that general results are dicult to obtain; see, for example, Dushnik
and Miller (1941), Kelly (1977, 1981), Trotter and Bogart (1976). Analogous diculties
emerge in the context of our problem and, as a consequence, our analysis in this paper is
restricted to two-agent exchange economies as well. In that case, the core coincides with
the set of Pareto ecient and individually rational allocations, which simplies matters
substantially. Core rationalizability (or even rationalizability of the set of Pareto e-
cient and individually rational allocations) in the general n-agent case remains an open
problem. However, the number of goods need not be restricted in our results.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our ba-
sic notation and denitions. In Section 3, we dene the axioms that are used in our
characterization of core rationalizability. Section 4 contains our main result|a theorem
establishing that these axioms are necessary and sucient for the core rationalizability
of a selection correspendence in a two-agent exchange economy. The independence of the
axioms is established in Section 5, and Section 6 concludes.
2 Notation and Denitions






the (nonnegative, positive) m-orthant. The origin of IR
m is denoted by 0 (because m is
assumed to be xed throughout the paper, this notation is unambiguous). Our notation
for vector inequalities is , >, . Weak and strict set inclusion are denoted by  and .
Suppose there are two agents in an exchange economy with m  2 goods. The
total endowments are given by ! 2 IR
m
++, and a feasible allocation is, without loss of
generality, represented in terms of agent 1's consumption bundle. That is, the set of
feasible allocations is given by E = fx 2 IR
m
+ j x  !g where, for all x 2 E, x is agent
1's consumption bundle and ! − x is the consumption of agent 2. For any S  T  E,
RIT(S) is the interior of S relative to T.
Because total endowments are xed throughout this paper, we can, for simplicity,
2restrict attention to individual preferences dened on E rather than on the entire con-
sumption space IR
m
+. A preference ordering R (with strict preference relation P and
indierence relation I)o nEis continuous if and only if the sets fx 2 E j xRyg and
fx 2 E j yRxg are closed for all y 2 E. R is strictly monotonic if and only if x>y
implies xPy for all x;y 2 E. The relation R is strictly convex if and only if, for all
x;y;z 2 E with x 6= y and all  2 (0;1), xRz and yRz implies (x +( 1− ) y ) Pz.
A classical exchange economy is an exchange economy where all agents' preferences are
continuous, strictly monotonic, and strictly convex.
Let R1 and R2 be the two agents' preference orderings. For convenience, we will
sometimes use agent 2's preference ordering on agent 1's consumption bundles that is
induced by R2. Specically, this ordering ~ R2 on E is dened by letting, for all x;y 2 E,
x~ R2y if and only if (! − x)R2(! − y). Clearly, each R2 determines a unique ~ R2 and vice
versa.
The set of Pareto ecient allocations for a preference prole (R1;R 2)i sg i v e nb y
PE(R 1;R 2)=f x2Ej6 9y 2 E such that yP1x and y ~ P2xg. For an initial endowment e 2
E, the set of individually rational allocations with respect to (R1;R 2)i sIR(R1;R 2;e)=
f x2EjxR1e and x ~ R2eg. The core of an exchange economy described by the endowment
vector e 2 E with respect to the prole (R1;R 2)i sg i v e nb yCO(R1;R 2;e)=PE(R 1;R 2)\
IR(R1;R 2;e). Of course, this denition of the core as the intersection of the sets of
ecient and individually rational points applies to the two-agent case only; for more than
two agents, intermediate-sized coalitions have to be considered as well.
A selection correspondence is a correspondence C:E !! E such that C(e) 6= ; for all
e 2 E. A selectioncorrespondence selects a set of recommended allocations for each vector
of initial endowments. Note that this formulation diers from the standard denition of a
choice correspondence. Whereas a choice correspondence selects a (nonempty) subset of
each feasible set within its domain, a selection correspondence as dened above identies
a subset of E for each endowment vector, and the set of feasible allocations|the set E|is
the same for all elements of the domain of C. C is core rationalizable if and only if there
exists a prole of continuous, strictly monotonic, and strictly convex preference orderings
(R1;R 2) such that C(e)=CO(R1;R 2;e) for all e 2 E.
Let ;6 =AE ,a n dl e tx;y 2 A be such that x 6= y.Ap a t hf r o mxto y in A is a
continuous function f:[0;1] ! A such that f(0) = x and f(1) = y.Ap a t hffrom x to y
in A is minimal if there exists no path g from x to y in A such that g([0;1])  f([0;1]).
If a path f from x to y in A is injective, it is called a simple path from x to y in A.As e t
AEis path connected if and only if, for all x;y 2 A with x 6= y, there exists a path
3from x to y in A. Clearly, path connectedness implies connectedness. See, for example,
Brown (1968, pp. 72{76) for a discussion of dierent notions of connectedness.
3A x i o m s
Because we work in a framework where a rationalization involves an entire prole of
preference orderings and we require rationalizing proles to have certain properties that
are natural in the context of exchange economies, the axioms used to characterize core
rationalizabilityare rather dierentfrom those that can be found in the standard literature
on rational choice. Intuitively, the axioms used have to reﬂect (i) the role of the initial
endowment in the economy; (ii) that the selections are consistent with the existence of
a contract curve; (iii) that the selections are consistent with individual rationality; and
(iv) that the preferences forming a rationalizing prole have the appropriate properties.
These requirements play an essential role in the formulations of our axioms. It should be
noted that, in the case of more than two agents, further properties of the core would have
to be taken into account|recall that, in the two-person case, the core coincides with the
set of ecient and individually rational allocations.
First, we impose a regularity condition on C the interpretation of which is straight-
forward. It requires that the correspondence C is continuous and the image of any point
e 2 E under C is a closed and connected set. Clearly, this condition is necessary for core
rationalizability.
Regularity: C is continuous and C(e) is closed and connected for all e 2 E.
The next axiom requires that if a point e 2 E is selected for some endowment vector,
then it must be the unique selected point if the endowment vector is e itself. Again, it
is clear that a core rationalizable selection correspondence must satisfy this condition.
Formally, this axiom|which we refer to as the persistence axiom|is dened as follows.
Persistence: For all e 2 C(E), C(e)=f e g .
Persistence can be motivated by appealing to the interpretation of determining selected
allocations in an exchange economy and the role played by the initial endowment in
making that selection. A selection correspondence can be interpreted as providing a set
of plausible (from a normative or descriptive viewpoint) allocations to which an economy
might want to move from a given initial endowment vector. If an allocation e has been
revealed to have some plausibility in the sense that it is a recommended selection for at
least some endowment vector, it is quite natural to postulate that, if e happens to be
4the initial endowment vector, no movement away from it should be recommended. As
mentioned above, the axioms used in a characterization of core rationalizability must be
expectedto lead towards establishing the existence of a contract curve and the requirement
of individual rationality, and the persistence axiom captures aspects of these requirements.
Our next axiom is a monotonicity property. The core of a two-agent classical ex-
change economy is strictly monotonic with respect to the distribution of the total en-
dowment in the following sense: from an agent's point of view, the best and worst al-
locations in the core get strictly better as his share of the total endowment becomes
strictly larger. Because the distribution of the total endowment is the only argument
of a selection correspondence, we need to translate that monotonicity property, which
is necessary for core rationalizability, into one that does not rely on the knowledge
of any other characteristics. To this end we introduce the following notation. For
e 2 E,l e tS 0 ( e )=f SC ( E )jC ( e )Sand 0 2 S and S is path connectedg and
S!(e)=f SC ( E )jC ( e )Sand ! 2 S and S is path connectedg. The following
strict path monotonicity condition requires that the intersection of the sets in S0(e)i s
strictly monotonic in e with respect to set inclusion, and an analogous requirement is
imposed on S!(e).













Finally, parallel to the role played by strict path monotonicity with respect to a
monotonicity property, we dene an averaging-reduction axiom which is related to the
strict convexity of the rationalizing individual preferences to be established. Observe
that the core of a two-agent classical exchange economy has the following property re-
garding the results of averaging two endowment vectors: any strict convex combination
of two distinct endowment vectors leads to a core such that the worst (best) alloca-
tion in this core for each agent is strictly better (worse) than the worst (best) allo-
cation in the union of the cores corresponding to the original two endowment vectors.
Again, the corresponding condition (which is necessary for core rationalizability) has to
be formulated entirely in terms of the primitives of the problem. For e;e0 2 E,l e t
S ( e;e0)=f SC( E )jC( e )[C( e 0)Sand S is path connectedg.
Strict Averaging Reduction: For all e;e0 2 E such that e 6= e0, for all  2 (0;1),








5The formulations of the last two axioms are somewhat involved. This is the case in
order to ensure that all axioms are dened on the primitives of the problem and that
each axiom can be dened on its own without reference to other properties, which is an
important aspect of a proper characterization.
4 Core-Rationalizable Selection Correspondences
The main result of this paper is a characterization of all core-rationalizable selection
correspondences by means of the axioms introduced in the previous section. Before stating
and proving it, we present to lemmas that will be used in its proof. The rst of those
establishes a result on the relationship between minimal paths and simple paths.1
Lemma 1 Let ;6 =AE , and let x;y 2 A be such that x 6= y. If there exists a minimal
path f:[0;1] ! A from x to y in A, then there exists a simple path g:[0;1] ! A from x
to y in A with g([0;1]) = f([0;1]).
Proof. Suppose f is a minimal path from x to y with x;y 2 A and x 6= y. The proof
proceeds by constructing a simple path g such that g([0;1]) = f([0;1]).
Let s0 =m a x f ujf ( u )=x gand dene the function h:[0;1] ! A by letting h(u)=
f ( s 0+u (1 − s0)) for all u 2 [0;1]. Because f is minimal, h is a path from x to y in A
such that h([0;1]) = f([0;1]) and h(u) 6= x for all u 2 (0;1]. Let t0 =m i n f ujh ( u )=y g ,
and dene g0:[0;1] ! A by letting g0(u)=h ( ut0) for all u 2 [0;1]. It follows that g0 is
ap a t hf r o mxto y in A such that g0([0;1]) = f([0;1]), g0(u) 6= x for all u 2 (0;1], and
g0(u) 6= y for all u 2 [0;1).
Next, let s1 =m i n f ujg 0 ( u )=g 0 (1=2)g and t1 =m a x f ujg 0 ( u )=g 0 (1=2)g.B y





g 0(2us1)i f u 2 [0;1=2];
g0(t1 +2 ( u−1 = 2)(1 − t1)) if u 2 (1=2;1]:
By denition, g1(u) 6= g1(1=2) for all u 2 [0;1]nf1 = 2 g. Next, we prove that g1([0;1=2]) \
g1([1=2;1]) = fg1(1=2)g. Clearly, g1(1=2) is in this intersection. By way of contradiction,





g 1(2u~ s1)i f u 2 [0;1=2];
g1(~ t1 +2 ( u−1 = 2)(1 − ~ t1)) if u 2 (1=2;1]:
1The proof of this lemma was provided by James Redekop.
6Then ~ g1 is a path from x to y in A such that g1(1=2) does not belong to ~ g1([0;1]). Thus,
~ g1([0;1]) is strictly included in f([0;1]), contradicting the minimality of f.
Now the above construction can be repeated for the intervals [0;1=2] and [1=2;1] to
obtain a path g2 from x to y in A such that g2([0;1]) = f([0;1]), g2([0;1=2])\g2([1=2;1]) =
fg2(1=2)g, g2([0;1=4]) \ g2([1=4;1=2]) = fg2(1=4)g,a n dg 2 ([1=2;3=4]) \ g2([3=4;1]) =
fg2(3=4)g. This procedure can be repeated to obtain, for any n 2 IN, a path g n from x to
y in A such that gn([0;1]) = f([0;1]), gn([j=2r;(j+1)=2 r])\gn([(j +1)=2 r;(j+2)=2 r]) =
fgn((j +1 ) = 2 r) gfor all r 2f 1 ;:::;ngand all j 2f 0 ;:::;2 r−2g,
g n([j=2r;(j+1 ) = 2 r]) \ gn([k=2r;(k+1 ) = 2 r]) = ; (1)
for all r 2f 1 ;:::;ng,a l lj2f 0 ;:::;2 r−1gand all k 2f 0 ;:::;2 r−1gnfj−1 ;j;j+1 g,
and
gn([j=2
n−1;(j+1 ) = 2
n − 1]) = gn−1([j=2
n−1;(j +1 ) = 2
n − 1]) (2)
for all j 2f 0 ;:::;2 n−1−1g.N o t et h a t ,f o ra l ln2IN and for all u;v 2 [0;1], gn(u)=g n( v )
implies ju−vj < 2−n, that is, violations of injectivity are such that distinct points where
gn assumes the same value are moving closer and closer together as n increases.
For all n 2 IN and all u 2 [0;1], let  k(n;u) be the unique integer such that  k(n;u)=2n 
u<(  k ( n;u)+1 ) = 2 n. Dene ^ g(u)=
T
n 2 IN gn([ k(n;u)=2n;( k(n;u)+1 ) = 2 n]). By (2) and
the observation that these sets are subsets of the compact set f([0;1]), ^ g(u)i sn o n e m p t y
for all u 2 [0;1]. Next, we show that ^ g(u) is a singleton for all u 2 [0;1]. Consider rst
the case u 2 (0;1]. Let v<u ,a n dl e tr;j;k be such that v 2 [j=2r;(j +1 ) = 2 r]a n d
u2[ k=2r;(k +1 ) = 2 r]w i t hk<j−1a n dr2f 1 ;:::;ng. By (1) and the denition of
^ g, it follows that ^ g(v) \ ^ g(u)=; . Because ^ g([0;1]) = f([0;1]) and ^ g(u)  f([0;1]), it
follows that ^ g(u) is a singleton. That ^ g(0) is a singleton follows analogously. Therefore,
we can dene an injective function g:[0;1] ! A by letting, for all u 2 [0;1] and all a 2 A,
g(u)=aif and only if ^ g(u)=f a g .W eh a v eg (0) = x, g(1) = y,a n dg ([0;1]) = f([0;1]).
That g is continuous follows from the continuity of f and the denition of g. Therefore,
g has all the required properties.
Our second preliminary result shows that persistence and strict path monotonicity
impose some structure on the image of E under C. In particular, those two axioms imply
that C(E) is the image of a simple path from 0 to ! in C(E).
Lemma 2 If C satises persistence and strict path monotonicity, then there exists a
simple path f:[0;1] ! C(E) from 0 to ! in C(E) such that C(E)=f([0;1]).
7Proof. First, we show that
C(0)=f 0 gand C(!)=f ! g : (3)
Suppose, by way of contradiction, that C(0) 6= f0g. Because C(0) is nonempty, there
exists x 2 C(0) such that x>0 . By persistence, C(x)=f x g . Therefore, C(x)  C(0).







contradicting strict path monotonicity. That C(!)=f ! gis proven analogously.
Using (3), we next prove
S0(!) 6= ;: (4)





















which proves that S0(!)i sn o n e m p t y .
Clearly, (4) implies that there exists a path from 0 to ! in C(E). This observation is
now used to show that
C(E)=S
0for all S
0 2S 0( ! ) : (6)
Let S0 2S 0 ( ! ). By denition, S0  C(E). To prove the converse set inclusion, let
x 2 C(E). If x = 0 or x = !, x 2 S0 follows from the denition of S0(!)a n dt h ef a c t
that C(!)=f ! g . Now suppose 0 <x<! . By persistence, C(x)=f x g . Using strict









S  S0 (7)











which completes the proof of (6). Because all elements of S0(!)a r ee q u a lt oC ( E ), it
follows that C(E) is a minimal path from 0 to ! in C(E). By Lemma 1, it follows that
there exists a simple path f:[0;1] ! C(E)f r o m0to ! in C(E) such that C(E)=f([0;1]).
Now we can prove
Theorem 1 C is core rationalizable if and only if C satises regularity, persistence, strict
path monotonicity, and strict averaging reduction.
Proof. Clearly, if C is core rationalizable, it satises the required axioms. Now suppose C
satises regularity, persistence, strict path monotonicity, and strict averaging reduction.
The proof that C is core rationalizable is constructive and proceeds as follows. Using
Lemma 2, we dene a continous and antisymmetric ordering  on C(E). Based on this
ordering , we dene individual orderings R1 and R2 and show that they are continuous,
strictly monotonic, and strictly convex. The proof is completed by proving that (R1;R 2)
core rationalizes C.
By Lemma 2, there exists a simple path f:[0;1] ! C(E)f r o m0to ! in C(E)s u c h
that C(E)=f([0;1]). Dene the relation  on C(E) by letting, for all x;y 2 C(E),
x  y , f
−1(x)  f
−1(y):
Clearly, this relation is a well-dened continuous and antisymmetric ordering because the
simple path f is a continuous and injective function dened on a compact set.
Now we use  to dene orderings R1 and ~ R2 (and, thus, R2). For x 2 E, dene
min C(x)a n dm a x C ( x ) as follows. For all z 2 E,m i n C ( x )=zif and only if
z 2 C(x)a n dz 0zfor all z0 2 C(x), and max C(x)=zif and only if z 2 C(x)a n d
zz 0for all z0 2 C(x). Because C(x)i sc l o s e da n dis a continuous and antisymmetric
ordering, min C(x)a n dm a x C( x ) are well-dened and unique for all x 2 E. Now dene
9the relations R1, ~ R2,a n dR 2as follows. For all x;y 2 E,
xR1y , min
 C(x)  min
 C(y);
x ~ R2y , max
 C(y)  max
 C(x);
xR2y , (! − x) ~ R2(! − y):
Clearly, these relations are orderings. We have to show that R1 and R2 are continuous,
strictly monotonic, and strictly convex, and that C is core rationalized by (R1;R 2). Be-
cause the proof for R2 is analogous, we only establish continuity, strict monotonicity, and
strict convexity for R1.
To show that R1 is continuous, let x 2 E,a n dl e t<y n> n 2 IN be a sequence such that
yn 2 E and ynR1x for all n 2 IN. Suppose <y n> n 2 IN converges to y0 2 E.W eh a v et o
prove that y0R1x. By denition of R1,
min
 C(yn)  min
 C(x)( 8 )
for all n 2 IN. Because C and  are continuous, the maximum theorem (see, for example,
Berge, 1963, Chapter VI) implies that
min
 C(yn) −! min
 C(y0): (9)
If xP1y0, it follows that minC(x)  min C(y0), which is a contradiction to (8) and (9).
Therefore, because R1 is an ordering, we must have y0R1x.
Next, we prove the strict monotonicity of R1. For any x 2 E, it follows from Lemma
2 that all elements of S!(x) are one and the same set. Specically, using the denition of
,





S = fz 2 C(E) j z  min
 C(x)g: (10)
Suppose x>y . By strict path monotonicity and (10), min C(x)  min C(y) and, thus,
xP1y.
In order to establish strict convexity, because R1 is continuous and strictly monotonic,
it is sucient to prove that, for all x;y;z 2 E with x 6= y and all  2 (0;1), if xI1yI1z,
then (x +( 1− ) y) P 1z. Analogously to the proof of strict monotonicity, it follows that
\
S2S(x;y)
S = fz 2 C(E) j max
 (C(x)[ C(y))  z  min
 (C(x)[ C(y))g (11)
10for all x;y 2 E.L e t xI1yI1z, x 6= y,a n d2(0;1). Therefore, using (11), it follows
that minC(x)=m i n C ( y )=m i n C ( z )62 RIC(E)(\S2S(x;y)S). By strict averaging
reduction, min C(x+(1−)y)2RIC(E)(\S2S(x;y)S). Because  is antisymmetric, this
implies min C(x +( 1− ) y)min C(z) and hence (x +( 1− ) y) P 1z.
Finally, to show that (R1;R 2) core rationalizes C, it is sucient to prove that
C(E)  PE(R 1;R 2); (12)
C(e)  IR(R1;R 2;e) for all e 2 E; (13)
CO(R1;R 2;e)C(e) for all e 2 E: (14)
(12) Suppose x 2 C(E)a n dx62 PE(R 1;R 2). This implies that there exists y 2 E
such that yP1x and y ~ P2x. Because x 2 C(E), persistence implies C(x)=f x gand,
thus, min C(x)=m a x C ( x )=x . Therefore, by denition of R1 and ~ R2,m i n C ( y )
min C(x)=m a x C( x )max C(y), a contradiction.
(13) Suppose e 2 E and x 2 C(e). By denition, max C(e)  x  minC(e).
By persistence, C(x)=f x gand, thus, minC(x)=m a x C ( x )=x . Therefore,
min C(x)  min C(e)a n dm a x C ( e )max C(x), which is equivalent to xR1e and
x ~ R2e and hence x 2 IR(R1;R 2;e).
(14) Suppose x 2 PE(R 1;R 2), xR1e,a n dx~ R 2e . First, we show that x 2 C(E). By way
of contradiction, suppose x 62 C(E). Let y;z 2 C(E) be such that yI1x and z~ I2x. y and z
are well-dened and unique by denition of R1 and ~ R2 and because  is an antisymmetric
ordering. By strict convexity, there exists a hyperplane through x separating the upper
contour sets of R1 and ~ R2 at x (this hyperplane has a positive normal because of strict
monotonicity). Thus, y cannot be in the upper contour set of ~ R2 at z and, hence,
z ~ P2y: (15)
By strict monotonicity, 0 ~ R2x~ I2z. Because (i) C(E) is the image of a simple path from 0
to ! in C(E); (ii)  is an antisymmetric ordering; and (iii) z is uniquely dened, it follows
that z0 ~ R2z for all z0 2 E such that z  z0. Because z =m a x C ( x )minC(x)=y ,
it follows that z  y and hence y ~ R2z, contradicting (15). Therefore, the assumption
x 62 C(E) is false and we must have x 2 C(E). Consequently,
C(x)=f x g (16)
by persistence. By denition of R1 and ~ R2,m i n C ( x )min C(e)a n dm a x C ( e )
max C(x). Together with (16), it follows that max C(e)  x  minC(e). Because
C(e) is a connected subset of C(E)a n dx2C ( E ), this implies x 2 C(e).
11The individual preference orderings constructed in the proof of Theorem 1 are unique|
that is, if a selection correspondence is core rationalizable, there is only one prole of
preference orderings that generates the selected allocations as the core elements. This
means that our notion of core rationalizability provides a way of recovering individual
preferences from observed collective selections without having to observe prices.
5 Independence of the Axioms
The axioms used in Theorem 1 are independent. For each of the following examples, the
axiom that is violated is indicated and the remaining axioms of Theorem 1 are satised.
Regularity. (i) Continuity of C.L e tR 1and R2 be such that R2 is continuous, strictly
monotonic, and convex, R1 is strictly monotonic and strictly convex and continuous `al-
most everywhere,' except at a `pole' located o the contract curve. See, for example, Hur-
wicz and Richter (1971) for a discussion of poles. Let, for all e 2 E, C(e)=CO(R1;R 2;e).
(ii) Closedness of C(e) for all e 2 E.L e tR 1and R2 be identical continuous, strictly
monotonic, and strictly convex preferences. Let C(e)=RIC(E)(CO(R1;R 2;e)) if e is not
on the contract curve, and C(e)=f e gif e is on the contract curve.
(iii) Connectedness of C(e) for all e 2 E.L e t R 1and R2 be identical continuous,
strictly monotonic, and strictly convex preferences generating a linear contract curve. If
e is not on the contract curve, divide CO(R1;R 2;e) into three equal-length segments and
let C(e) be the union of the two closed segments containing the extreme points of the
core. If e is on the contract curve, let C(e)=f e g .
Persistence. Let R1 and R2 be identical continuous, strictly monotonic, and strictly
convex preferences generating a linear contract curve. For all e 2 E,l e tC ( e )b et h e
closed line segment on the contract curve connecting the half-way point between the core
and 0 and the half-way point between the core and !.
Strict path monotonicity. Let R1 and R2 be identical continuous, strictly convex,
but not monotonic preferences, and let C(e)=CO(R1;R 2;e) for all e 2 E.
Strict averaging reduction. For all e 2 E,l e tC ( e ) be the set consisting of the
unique point of intersection of the line passing through 0 and ! and the hyperplane







This paper provides an analysis of collective rational choice in a two-person exchange
economy. In particular, we examine the rationalizability of selection correspondences in
terms of the core. As is the case for many related questions (see, for example, Dushnik
and Miller, 1941, and Sprumont, 1999), our results are restricted to the two-agent case.
We realize that this restriction imposes serious limitations on the applicability of our
results but given the diculties involved in obtaining characterization results in higher
dimensions for that type of problem, we hope that this paper will be of use as a starting
point for further investigations into this and related topics.
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